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ABSTRACT 
 
The aims of this paper are fourfold. The first aim is to characterize two distinct forms of 
circumstantial moral luck and illustrate how they are implicitly recognized in pre-theoretical 
moral thought. The second aim is to identify a significant difference between the ways in 
which these two kinds of circumstantial luck are morally relevant. The third aim is to show 
how the acceptance of circumstantial moral luck relates to the acceptance of resultant moral 
luck. The fourth aim is to defuse a legitimate concern about accepting the existence of 
circumstantial moral luck, namely the fact that its existence implies substantial moral risks.  
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1. Locating the issue 
 
The aims of this paper are fourfold. The first aim is to characterize two distinct forms of 
circumstantial moral luck and illustrate how they are implicitly recognized in pre-theoretical 
moral thought. The second aim is to identify a significant difference between the ways in 
which these two kinds of circumstantial luck are morally relevant. The two kinds of 
circumstantial moral luck are morally relevant in different ways insofar as in one case the 
luck in question is a ‘choice-dependent’ aspect of moral assessment and in the other a 
‘choice-independent’ aspect of moral assessment. The third aim is to show how the 
acceptance of circumstantial moral luck is relevant to the acceptance of the more widely 
discussed case of resultant moral luck. The case for accepting circumstantial moral luck is 
relevant to the case for accepting resultant moral luck because it serves to mitigate one 
theoretical cost of accepting the existence of resultant moral luck. The theoretical cost in 
question is the need to substantially qualify the claim that coherent moral assessments are 
constrained by features of an agent’s situation that are within that agent’s control. The fourth 
aim is to defuse one legitimate concern about the existence of circumstantial moral luck. It is 
argued that this concern arises from wrongly inferring from the plausible claim that the 
recognition of circumstantial moral luck carries with it substantial moral risks the implausible 
claim that those risks are such as to militate against its recognition. 
 
Cases of circumstantial moral luck form a subset of a wider class of cases in which the moral 
assessment of agents depends on factors beyond their control. What is distinctive about cases 
of circumstantial moral luck is that the factors in question involve contingent aspects of their 
situation that are external to themselves and the (prior or posterior) causal operations of their 
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agency.ii The aspects in question include actually being presented with a situation that 
morally calls for a response, where that situation is in no interesting sense of the agent’s own 
making. Typical examples include cases where someone finds themselves ‘thrown’ into a 
situation in which they are presented with vulnerability or risk facing a morally significant 
other (e.g. when witnessing a life-threatening emergency). They also include cases where for 
contingent historical reasons an agent’s otherwise admirable dispositions are deemed to be 
‘out of place’ (e.g. when exhibiting consistently distrusting behaviour in an environment 
characterized by trust, or vice versa).iii 
 
The examples of circumstantial moral luck discussed in this paper include comparatively 
simple cases where an agent is able to manifest a morally admirable disposition and thereby 
act either rightly or well. (Responding to a situation of acute vulnerability or risk by offering 
assistance would be one example of manifesting an admirable moral disposition in this way.) 
Yet some of the examples discussed involve agents for whom it is much less clear that there 
is any way for them to successfully manifest an admirable disposition and thereby act rightly 
or well in a given situation. For such agents, the problem is that there is no accessible way for 
them to overcome their (bad) circumstantial moral luck. (Being faced with a ‘tragic’ situation 
in which any display of one’s disposition of trustworthiness would be ‘out of place’ would be 
one example of being a victim of bad circumstantial moral luck in this way.)iv Although it is 
not the aim of this paper to conclusively establish the existence of either kind of 
circumstantial moral luck, their implicit recognition in pre-theoretical moral thought is of 
sufficient interest to be worthy of more theoretical attention than they have tended to 
receive.v There is also a pressing need to get clear about the case for the existence of 
circumstantial moral luck in a socio-political environment in which arguments are sometimes 
given for legal, institutional or cultural changes that either invite or imply the differential 
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moral assessment of individuals based purely on their membership of different demographic 
groups.vi 
 
In focusing on circumstantial moral luck, I shall take the discussion of moral luck in a 
somewhat different direction than what has often been common in recent discussions of 
moral luck (e.g. the issue of how luck affects what Bernard Williams called ‘agent regret’ 
(see e.g. Williams 1981; Enoch 2012). The line of thought I pursue here is therefore 
orthogonal to the concerns of many philosophers who have recently made important 
contributions to the literature on this topic. The main focus in this literature has often been on 
how we should think about cases where prior acts of individual volition are already in play 
(e.g. in Williams’s case of ‘Gaugin’, who leaves his family behind in order to take the 
uncertain path of pursuing his own artistic ambitions (see e.g. Slote 1994; Zagzebski 1996; 
Domsky 2004; Athanassoulis 2005; Raz 2012; Hwang 2013)).vii In contrast to most of these 
discussions, the primary focus in this paper will be on the moral relevance of facts of about a 
situation in which someone already finds themselves, as opposed to facts about that situation 
that would result from how they subsequently go on to act in that situation. I shall, however, 
make an explicit connection between the discussion of circumstantial luck in this paper and 
previous discussions of resultant luck in Section 4 below.  
 
It is a working assumption of the discussion that follows that it makes sense to interpret moral 
assessments that imply the existence of circumstantial moral luck by taking those assessments 
at ‘face value’. In other words, it is a working assumption of these arguments that the 
apparent commitment to circumstantial luck that is present in pre-theoretical moral thought is 
a commitment to just that, and not a commitment to something else in disguise (or something 
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else misleadingly expressed). Although I shall briefly discuss the alternative in passing, I 
shall make no attempt to independently justify this working assumption in this paper. 
 
2. The problem of moral luck 
 
According to one canonical formulation, the problem of moral luck arises from the allegedly 
i) questionable legitimacy, of ii) genuinely moral assessments, of iii) individual agents, in 
cases where, iv) significant aspects of what the agents are assessed for depend on v) factors 
beyond their individual control (Nelkin 2014; my italics). In what follows, I shall interpret 
the problem of moral luck as arising from the conflict between two moral principles. 
According to the first principle, coherent moral assessments of agents are constrained by 
features of the situation of those agents that are within their control. (Compare, for example, 
the case of a morally innocent bystander who is coercively used as an innocent shield by a 
group of murderous villains.) This is the so-called ‘control condition’ on moral assessment. 
According to the second principle, some coherent moral assessment of agents depend on 
features of their situation that are beyond their control. (Consider, for example, a competent 
driver who accidentally runs over and kills a pedestrian.) Let’s call this the ‘luck sensitivity’ 
of moral assessment. The problem of moral luck is whether (and if so, how) the conflict 
between the ‘control condition’ and ‘luck sensitivity’ can be resolved.viii To be clear from the 
start, I shall take it as given that the first principle on which the conflict depends does 
genuinely express a deep moral insight. The insight in question is that the degree of control 
exercised by an agent is always a morally significant factor in a situation.  Hence, it is a 
genuine moral ‘difference maker’. Hence, the absence of control in a given situation does 
give grounds for morally assessing people differently than one otherwise would (e.g. by 
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mitigation or excuse). My primary interest is not in the question whether the presence of 
control should make a difference to the moral assessment of agents, but rather how much (or 
what kind of) difference it should make. 
 
3. Taking circumstantial moral luck seriously 
 
The different ways in which agents can be thought of as vulnerable to circumstantial moral 
luck can be divided into two kinds. I shall label these ‘redemption’ cases and ‘non-
redemption’ cases, respectively. In what follows, I give a schematic description of the 
distinguishing features of each kind and illustrate their moral significance by means of 
examples.  
 
3.a. Redemption cases 
 
In some European countries, failure to respond to acute vulnerability or risk involving 
morally significant others is proscribed by law, in the form of so-called ‘Good Samaritan 
legislation’. Elsewhere, legislators have historically been more reluctant to engage in this 
kind of legal ‘enforcement of altruism’ (Feldbrugge 1965). Yet whatever the legal situation 
is, the following two thoughts are widely recognized. The first is that actively responding to 
acute vulnerability or risk (whether by providing assistance or at least reporting it) is a 
‘good’, ‘admirable’ or ‘virtuous’ thing to do. The second thought is that responding to acute 
vulnerability or risk with indifference or hostility is ‘bad’, ‘vicious’, ‘wrong’, or 
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‘impermissible’ (see e.g. Lillehammer 2014). Hence it is widely thought that when faced with 
a situation involving acute vulnerability or risk to morally significant others a morally 
responsible agent will respond favourably to said vulnerability or risk. Of course, it is often 
hard to tell what the best way to address the vulnerability or risk in question is (e.g. who, if 
anyone, should be responsible for taking the initiative to address it; how the responsibilities 
to address it can be most effectively exercised; how the responsibility to address it is best 
distributed; whether enough is already being done by others to address it, and so on). Yet 
however uncertain people may be about the best way to respond to such situations, there is a 
widely recognized commitment to norms and principles that make substantial demands with 
respect to what a morally responsible way to respond rules out (e.g. what not to do when 
observing an accident on the motorway; when witnessing a medical emergency on the 
underground; or when faced with a ‘crisis’ involving refugees or migrants, and so on). 
 
These kinds of moral assessment frequently involve an element of circumstantial luck (c.f. 
Nagel 1979; Zimmerman 1987; Urban Walker 1991; Silcox 2006; Hanna 2014). Here I shall 
consider two examples of this kind of luck. Each example involves an individual who is faced 
with some actual or possible situation involving acute vulnerability or risk on the part of 
morally significant others. In each example, the situation in question is one that is not of their 
making. Consider first the case of Citizen A, who would offer protection or help to an 
endangered other; who is confronted with an endangered other; and who does offer protection 
or help. Consider next the case of Citizen B, who would offer protection or help to an 
endangered other; who is not confronted with an endangered other; and who therefore does 
not offer protection or help. The way things actually go for Citizens A and B, Citizen A is 
someone who others may subsequently come to hold in particularly high esteem. Yet the only 
relevant difference between A and B is that Citizen A (but not B) was actually faced with an 
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extreme situation in a way that was beyond their control. In other words, Citizen A had the 
‘fortune’ (if that is the word) of being able to display their admirable disposition to respond 
the way the situation called for, whereas Citizen B did not. Yet holding Citizen A in 
comparatively higher esteem than Citizen B is not thereby ‘unfair’ to B, given the difference 
between what A and B actually did. Of course, there is another respect in which Citizens A 
and B are morally on a par: they both exemplify a morally admirable disposition. Yet there is 
a further respect in which they are importantly different: only one of them (i.e. Citizen A) 
actually responded to the acute vulnerability and risk of a morally significant other. What 
makes the difference in this case is essentially a matter of what actually happened, not of 
what possibly could have happened. This is one respect in which some coherent moral 
assessments are affected by circumstantial luck.ix 
 
Now consider two further cases of people with respect to actual or possible situations 
involving the acute vulnerability or risk to morally significant others. Once more, in each 
case the situations in question are not of their making. Consider first the ‘cold-hearted’ 
Citizen C, who would not offer protection or help to an endangered other; who is confronted 
with an endangered other; and who does not offer protection or help. Consider next the case 
of Citizen D, who would not offer protection or help to an endangered other; who is not 
confronted with an endangered other; and who does not offer protection or help. Given the 
way things actually go for C and D, Citizen C is someone who others may subsequently come 
to hold in particularly low esteem. Yet the only relevant difference between C and D is that 
Citizen C (but not D) was actually faced with an extreme situation in a way that was beyond 
their control. Citizen C therefore had the ‘misfortune’ (if that is the word) of being able to 
display their non-admirable disposition not to respond in the way the situation called for. 
Citizen D was spared that ‘misfortune’. Yet holding Citizen C in comparatively lower esteem 
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than Citizen D is not thereby ‘unfair’ to C, given the difference between what C and D 
actually did. Of course, there is another respect in which Citizens C and D are morally on a 
par: they both exemplify a morally questionable disposition. Yet there is a further respect in 
which they are importantly different: only one of them (i.e. Citizen C) actually failed to 
respond to the acute vulnerability and risk of a morally significant other. Once more, what 
makes the difference in this case is a matter of what actually happens, not merely of what 
possibly could have happened.x Once more, this is one respect in which some coherent moral 
assessments are affected by circumstantial luck.xi 
 
Citizens A, B, C and D can be compared along two separate dimensions of assessment. The 
first dimension concerns whether or not the agents display some admirable disposition. The 
second dimension concerns how the agents in question actually act (or do not act). Along the 
first dimension, Citizen B is morally on a par with A. Along the second dimension, Citizen B 
is morally on a par with C and D. Yet Citizen B is not thereby morally on a par with C and D 
all things considered. For example, it would be surprising to be told that Citizen B is a 
suitable object of censure in the way that C is. After all, C’s cold-hearted disposition actually 
prevents him from acting in the way the situation calls for when confronted with an extreme 
situation in a way that is not true of Citizen B. Nor is Citizen B a suitable object of censure in 
just the same way that D is, even if D, just like B, has the ‘fortune’ of not actually having the 
moral quality of his disposition put to the test. If so, an overall judgement of the 
schematically described cases of A, B, C and D allows us to make sense of a comparative 
moral assessment of these agents as follows: B is held in lower esteem than A; C is held in 
lower esteem than D; and D is held in lower esteem than B. This is the case even though none 
of B, C or D actually responded to the acute vulnerability or risk of a morally significant 
other. If coherent moral assessments excluded all elements of circumstantial luck, this 
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comparative assessment of the intrinsic merits of A, B, C and D’s behaviour would make no 
intrinsic sense.xii And yet (or so it would seem) it does. xiii 
 
3.b. Non-redemption cases 
 
So far I have been focusing on cases of circumstantial luck in which the agents involved are 
in principle able to exemplify a virtuous disposition by acting rightly or well. I have labelled 
these cases ‘redemption cases’. Not all cases of circumstantial luck belong in this class. In 
other cases, the circumstances in which agents find themselves are such as to make even the 
otherwise most admirable set of dispositions either ‘misfire’ or otherwise fail to manifest 
themselves in the right way. In such cases, a range of otherwise achievable moral excellences 
will be contingently out of reach, at least in the short or medium term. I label such cases 
‘non-redemption’ cases.xiv  
 
We are all familiar with otherwise admirably motivated forms of behaviour which, given the 
particular social context of their manifestation, are deemed to be either ‘out of place’ or 
otherwise inappropriate. (Consider, for example, a friend from ‘the province’ whose displays 
of openness or intimacy are considered inappropriate in ‘cosmopolitan’ company.) In some 
cases, the problem is a synchronic one about the persons displaying said behaviour finding 
themselves in circumstances hostile to the morally admirable display of their natural or 
cultivated abilities. Consider Citizen E, who has an impeccable disposition never to speak out 
of turn. In a cultural context where never speaking out of turn is a mark of acceptable 
conversational behaviour, Citizen E may be hailed as a paradigm of virtue. Yet, against a 
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different social background, so may Citizen F, who has an unfailing disposition to interrupt 
every conversation in order to get their point across in a context where constant interruptions 
are a recognized part of the natural flow of respectful conversation. If a person like Citizen E 
(let’s call them Citizen G) were to be suddenly dropped into the company of Citizen F, or a 
person like Citizen F (let’s call them Citizen H) were to be suddenly dropped into the 
company of Citizen E, the chances are that their ability to cope with the socially operative 
norms of good conversation would at best require a process of concerted adjustment. In their 
new environment, Citizen G might be considered ineffectual, weak, or someone not to 
depend on when things get tough (e.g. when standing up for people in an emergency). Citizen 
H, however, might be considered aggressive, rude, and a kind of person it is better to avoid 
(e.g. when deciding who to converse with about serious issues). At worst, Citizens G and H 
would be permanently compromised by the dispositions they may have ever so carefully 
cultivated in their original environment (whether on trivial matters of ‘etiquette’, or on basic 
matters of survival). In either case, their ability to display the kind of social behaviour their 
interlocutors would qualify as virtuous or admirable would be (at least initially) 
compromised. Yet with respect to the dispositions they have been able to cultivate, Citizens E 
and G (or F and H) could be perfectly on a par with respect to the morally relevant aspects of 
their situation that are within their control.xv  
 
In other cases, the problem is a diachronic one about the persons displaying said behaviour 
finding themselves in circumstances where the moral assessment of said behaviour is subject 
to historical change (e.g. because the occasion for its display is judged to be ‘out of date’, or 
‘too late’).xvi Consider Citizen I, who is generally able to control their (explicit or implicit) 
biases in their dealings with some ‘out-group’, while carrying out their professional activities 
in a public institution in early 20th Century Western Europe. Compare Citizen I to Citizen K, 
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who in exactly the same social circumstances is either unable or unwilling to make any 
attempt to address or control the biases in question. In a cultural context where discrimination 
and prejudice directed at the relevant ‘out-groups’ is either considered normal or is even 
widely applauded, one might reasonably single out Citizen I out as an exemplar of virtue, at 
least with reference to the comparison class that includes Citizen K. (The History books 
include enough examples of this kind for the case to be widely recognizable.) Of course, this 
is not to say that one would thereby judge the behaviour of citizens who fail to display 
Citizen I’s degree of self-control as being morally beyond reproach.xvii Now consider Citizen 
J, who is generally able to control their (explicit or implicit) biases in the context of handling 
some social ‘out-group’ while carrying out their professional activities in a public institution 
in early 21st Century Western Europe. Compare Citizen J to Citizen L, who in exactly the 
same social circumstances is either unable or unwilling to make any attempt to control the 
biases in question. In a cultural context where discrimination and prejudice directed at the 
relevant ‘out-groups’ have generally come to be considered unacceptable and is widely 
censured, it would not be reasonable to single out Citizen J as an exemplar of virtue, even 
with reference to the comparison class that includes Citizen L.xviii On the contrary, the way 
Citizen J’s moral achievement of controlling their biases is morally assessed will be sensitive 
to an historically contingent and specific reference class. The choice of this reference class 
will be sensitive to what other morally competent people judge they can reasonably expect of 
each other. This, in turn, will be sensitive to what other people say and do in the specific 
historical circumstances in which the individuals being morally assessed happen to find 
themselves. Given that these circumstances are relevantly different with respect to the 
common expectations made of public officials in the early 20th and the early 21st Century, for 
example, it is only reasonable to expect that the moral assessments made of otherwise 
identical behaviour across these contexts will correspondingly differ. 
	 13	
 
The line of thought in the previous paragraph can be further motivated by asking what a 
colleague might say to Citizens I and J respectively if the question were to come up of 
whether it would be appropriate to single them out for some special kind of moral praise or 
reward. In the case of Citizen I there is a reasonable case for claiming that they are deserving 
of some kind of special moral praise or reward. In the case of Citizen J that case is at least 
weaker. Indeed, it would not be entirely surprising to hear someone addressing Citizen J by 
refusing to consider them for any significant moral praise or reward, on the grounds that it is 
‘too late’ for that now, however much one might otherwise recognize their personal effort or 
diligence.xix Indeed, in some cases the perceived moral valence of otherwise admirable 
behaviour can actually be observed to switch over time. These include examples where 
certain behaviours or forms of address that have traditionally been regarded as expressive of 
respect or reverence have come to be regarded as patronizing, antiquated, or as signs of 
disrespect (e.g. being addressed as ‘ladies and gentlemen’, or men consistently holding doors 
open for women at restaurants, and so on (c.f. Oshana 2006)).xx  
 
As presented above, the case for assessing Citizens I and J differently should not be 
understood as a refusal to appreciate the moral significance the control-based aspects of their 
moral performance. We can agree that their ability to control their biases is a morally 
significant achievement both for Citizen I and Citizen J. We can also agree that this ability is 
no more or less within their personal control in one case than in the other. Finally, we can 
agree that any actual display of bias, discrimination or prejudice would be wrong, no less in 
Citizen I’s circumstances than in J’s. In this one respect, we can agree that Citizens I and J 
are morally on a par.  Yet it does not follow that Citizens I and J are exactly on a par with 
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respect to the overall moral assessment of their performance. They will not be exactly on a 
par with respect to the moral assessment of their performance insofar as the overall moral 
significance of their performance is further sensitive to the social and historical context in 
which that performance takes place. For example, the overall assessment of their performance 
is likely to be sensitive to what the locally accessible terms are in which that performance can 
be interpreted, and what the agents in question could reasonably be expected to make of it as 
a result. 
 
4. Interpretations and implications 
 
4.a. Choice-dependence versus choice-independence 
 
There is more than one way to understand the claim that the moral assessments of agents can 
be affected by features of their situation beyond their control. Here I consider two. On the 
first interpretation, ‘being affected by’ implies that some feature of an agent’s situation makes 
a difference to the moral assessment of that agent in the sense that it is one among a larger set 
of facts that make it possible (or not) for the agent’s behaviour to acquire some moral quality, 
depending on how the agent goes on to act. To this extent it is a ‘choice-sensitive’ aspect of 
moral assessment. It is in this sense that the moral assessment of agents can be hostage to 
circumstantial moral luck in the case of someone who actually is (or is not) presented with a 
case of acute vulnerability or risk to some morally significant other. It is also therefore 
circumstantial luck in this ‘choice-sensitive’ sense that is the distinguishing feature of the 
‘redemption’ cases discussed in the previous section. 
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On the second interpretation, ‘being affected by’ implies that some feature of an agent’s 
situation makes a difference to the moral assessment of that agent in the sense that it is one 
among a larger set of facts that make it possible (or not) for the agent’s behaviour to acquire 
some moral quality, regardless of how the agent goes on to act. To this extent it is a ‘choice-
independent’ aspect of moral assessment.  It is in this sense that the moral assessment of 
agents can be hostage to circumstantial moral luck in the case of someone whose moral 
performance in a certain situation is ‘tainted’ or otherwise affected by the actions of others. It 
is therefore circumstantial luck in this ‘choice-independent’ sense that is the distinguishing 
feature of the ‘non-redemption’ cases discussed in the previous section. 
 
Both ‘choice-dependent’ and ‘choice-independent’ aspects of moral assessment imply the 
existence of circumstantial constraints on the kind of moral performance that individuals can 
hope to achieve. Yet they do so in different ways. In the former case, the moral assessment of 
an agent’s performance depends on features of their situation they themselves can affect by 
acting a certain way if the opportunity arises. In the latter case, the moral assessment of the 
agent’s performance is constrained by the features of their situation in such as way that the 
relevant moral qualities attributable to that performance will obtain regardless of how they go 
on to act. In the former case, we are dealing with a situation in which some given moral 
quality or status (such having acted beyond the call of duty) is in principle available 
depending on what the agent does. In the latter case, we are dealing with a situation in which 
some given moral quality or status (such as having acted beyond the call of duty) is simply 
not available (or is at least not available in the same way). 
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It is possible to accept the existence of one of these kinds of circumstantial moral luck while 
rejecting the existence of the other. In particular, it might seem less theoretically costly to 
accept only the existence of ‘choice dependent’ moral luck insofar as the ‘redemptive’ aspect 
of choice dependence offers at least some limited solace to those who feel a strong 
commitment to the ‘control condition’ on moral assessment. There would seem to be nothing 
of comparable theoretical gain in accepting only the existence of ‘choice-independent’ moral 
luck. To this extent, the case for ‘choice-dependent’ moral luck is the less theoretically 
problematic of the two. Given that the case for the existence of circumstantial moral luck 
would survive the rejection of either one or the other of ‘choice-dependent’ or ‘choice-
independent’ moral luck (but not both), this tentative conclusion would suffice to establish 
the main conclusions of the present paper. Having said that, the downstream costs of rejecting 
the existence of ‘choice-independent’ moral luck should not be underestimated. The 
rhetorical force of moral assessments that are specifically moderated by ‘non-redemptive’ 
aspects of the socio-political moral circumstances of their targets have arguably played an 
important historical role in the criticism and reform of undesirable practices and institutions, 
from the ethics of professional address to the unfairness of ‘old boys networks’.xxi To reject 
the existence of ‘choice-independent’ moral luck would therefore arguably require a 
significant reconfiguration of the theoretical basis of such assessments and the progressive 
politics of which they form a part.xxii 
 
4.b. Circumstantial versus resultant luck 
 
If what has been said in the previous section goes any way to mitigate against skepticism 
about the existence of circumstantial moral luck, then it arguably goes even further to 
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mitigate against skepticism about the existence of ‘resultant’ moral luck. After all, in cases of 
resultant luck, the putative luck in question stands in a non-trivial and (downstream) causal 
relation to ends the agent has actually set herself and her diligence in taking due account of 
the risks and contingent obstacles that stand in the way of their realization (e.g. in the case of 
a driver who accidentally runs over and kills a pedestrian). In such cases, any resultant moral 
luck will be located within a domain of circumstantial factors that is constitutively 
constrained by facts about the prior agency of that very individual. Although the existence of 
resultant moral luck is inconsistent with a strict reading of the ‘control condition’ on moral 
assessment, it conflicts with that condition only within a restricted event horizon (or causal 
‘cone’) that is fixed by how the target of moral assessment has previously exercised their 
agency (over which they are assumed to have had some control). In contrast, the luck that is 
operative in cases of circumstantial moral luck need not bear any interesting relation to how 
the target of moral assessment has previously exercised their agency at all. Thus, in both the 
‘redemption’ and ‘non-redemption’ cases discussed in the previous section, the fortuitous 
circumstantial features of the situation that affect the moral assessment of the agent could in 
each case be located entirely outside the restricted event horizon (or causal ‘cone) that is 
fixed by how the subject of moral assessment has previously their agency (over which they 
are assumed to have had some control).xxiii If the obstacle to admitting the existence of moral 
luck is that it fails to cohere with the ‘control condition’ of moral assessment, then the 
admission of resultant moral luck is therefore a lesser departure from a strict reading of that 
condition than is the admission of circumstantial moral luck. To this extent, the acceptance of 
resultant moral luck comes at a significantly lower theoretical cost than the acceptance of 
circumstantial moral luck.xxiv It follows that if there is no conclusive case for denying the 
possibility of coherent moral assessment in the case of circumstantial luck, there is no 
conclusive case for denying it in the case of resultant luck either, all-else-being-equal. 
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5. Two problems, no solution? 
 
There are several sources of reasonable suspicion about the kinds of circumstantial moral 
luck described in this paper. Here I shall mention two. The first source of suspicion is that the 
moral assessments made of agents in these cases fail to connect with the ‘real’ problem of 
moral luck, which is one about whether we can coherently assess someone morally for 
something that is beyond their control, and not a problem of whether we can coherently 
assess someone morally for how they go on to respond to something that is beyond their 
control.xxv If so, the classification of the cases described in this paper as examples of 
circumstantial moral luck is based on a simple confusion. 
 
This source of suspicion is misguided in the present context.xxvi The point at issue in the 
present paper is not whether someone is morally assessable for how they conduct themselves 
once they find themselves in a given situation. The issue is whether the moral assessment of 
that someone is sensitive to the mere fact they find themselves in that situation, where the 
fact that they find themselves in that situation is a matter beyond their control. How we deal 
with that point is a question that could obviously have serious implications for how it makes 
sense to morally assess the agent for how they go on to conduct themselves in that situation. 
Yet it is also an answer it must be possible to arrive at in some sense ‘prior’ to that 
assessment.xxvii  
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A more troubling source of suspicion derives from the undeniable fact that the existence of 
circumstantial moral luck implies the further existence of a number of substantial moral risks. 
For example, it might be objected that accepting the existence of circumstantial luck leaves 
the moral assessment of individuals unfairly hostage to the moral failings of others. Of course 
we can morally assess an agent for what she does in response to a situation in which she finds 
herself as a result of events beyond her control. Yet there is clearly something problematic 
about letting that assessment be affected by the mere fact that she finds herself in that 
situation if she does so only as a result of another person’s previous morally unacceptable 
behaviour (e.g. where the person who invited you to lunch mischievously leaves you with the 
bill). 
 
This worry about being unacceptably ‘imposed upon’ is a reasonable (and sometimes 
decisive) moral concern (see e.g. Kamm 2007). Indeed, to make oneself hostage to the 
morally bad behaviour of others in a morally imperfect world is a potential cause of absurd 
moral responsibility proliferation (e.g. because the less well other people behave, the further 
your moral responsibilities would extend). Even aside from the obvious co-ordination 
problems involved, the universal adoption of unrestricted moral responsibility cultivation and 
the negative self-appraisals this would entail is a recipe for: misunderstanding (e.g. ‘No, it is 
really not your business’, as objected by a victim of a moral ‘busybody’); despondency (e.g. 
‘I never seem to be able to do enough’, as lamented by a compulsive ‘supererogator’); 
moralistic arms-races (e.g. ‘Nothing short of the extraordinary is enough’, as argued by a 
moral perfectionist); undesirable side-effects (e.g. ‘How dare you even smile when...’, uttered 
as an accusation by someone unable to let go of some morally serious issue); or moral free-
riding (e.g. ‘This one (and that one, and that one...) falls on you.’, as manipulatively asserted 
by a moralising egoist). xxviii  
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There is a plethora of ways in which the acceptance of circumstantial moral luck is liable to 
badly distort moral thinking unless it is moderated by other morally relevant concerns. Yet 
the mere fact that moral thought is vulnerable to distortion in these and other ways does not 
rule out that the moral assessment of agents who are victims of circumstantial moral luck is a 
reflectively coherent possibility. In any case, the presence of some previous moral 
wrongdoing on the part of others in a certain situation does not normally cancel out every 
aspect of our own responsibility in that situation, even if it normally does alter some of it (e.g. 
when, having been left by others with all the mess, you decide to clean up some of it, but not 
all).xxix Furthermore, the fact that prior to the responsibility for a certain situation being 
accepted by someone there is no determinate answer to the question on whom some burden 
should fall (or how) does not imply that there is no responsibility to distribute in the first 
place (e.g. when everyone faced with an unforeseen emergency accepts a responsibility to 
ensure that the burdens of rescue are distributed effectively among themselves).xxx Finally, 
not all situations which morally call for a response are caused by the morally unacceptable 
behaviour of other people or, indeed, by the actions of anyone at all (e.g. in the case of a 
natural catastrophe, or a pandemic). To infer from the substantial moral risks that flow from 
accepting the existence of circumstantial moral luck that the very idea of such luck is either 
incoherent or misguided is to fall into the trap of making an impossible moral ‘ideal’ the 
enemy of ‘the actual’, or ‘real’. 
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6. Concluding remarks 
 
Some parts of pre-theoretical moral thought contain a commitment to the existence of 
circumstantial moral luck. Some of this luck plays the role of a choice-dependent aspect of 
the moral assessment of agents. Some of it plays the role of a choice-independent aspect of 
such assessment. To recognize the existence of either kind of circumstantial moral luck 
involves the recognition of a range of substantial moral risks. It also involves a commitment 
to a conception of moral thought that is potentially in tension with the idea that the domain of 
‘morality’ can be exhaustively accounted for in terms of an ideal of autonomous and 
independent individual agency. For some moral theorists of a strongly individualist 
persuasion, the fact of this tension presents a strong incentive to either deny the existence of 
circumstantial moral luck altogether or to explain away its existence in other terms. It has not 
been my aim in this paper to show that no theoretical strategy along these lines could possibly 
succeed. What I do claim to have shown is that the pursuit of such a strategy will struggle to 
make sense of the lived experience of moral thought. 
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i Parts of this material have been previously presented at a Birkbeck Guilt Colloquium in 
2014; an Ethics at the Intersection of Philosophy and Anthropology workshop on ‘Rethinking 
Responsibility’ at Birkbeck, in 2015; a CRASSH conference on ‘Hierarchy, Egalitarianism 
and Responsibility’ at Cambridge in 2016; a colloquium on ‘Modalities of the Good’, 
organized by the Czech Academy of Sciences and Charles University, Prague in 2016; and at 
departmental colloquia in Essex and Leeds, also in 2016. I am grateful to members of the 
audience on each of these occasions for their comments on the material presented there, and 
to James Laidlaw for his deep and insightful observations over many years on the topics of 
agency and responsibility. 
ii In saying this, I do not mean to imply that the distinction between circumstantial and other 
kinds of moral luck (e.g. causal, constitutive, resultant) need always be sharp. Nor do I mean 
to imply that no case of moral luck could ever fall into more than one of these categories. 
iii Examples may also include cases where someone benefits non-voluntarily from a past harm 
done by a third party to another (e.g. as a result of historical injustice or oppression). 
Although highly relevant to the main argument of the paper, such cases will not play a 
substantial role in the discussion that follows. I am grateful to Neil Carrier for helpful 
discussion of this topic. 
iv There is a close connection between the sense of ‘tragedy’ at work here and the notion of 
tragedy that has been with us at least since the Greeks. To trace those connections falls 
outside the remit of this paper. For further discussion of the issue, see e.g. Nussbaum 1986. 
v A comprehensive treatment of this issue would require a discussion of the difference 
between someone being prevented by their circumstances from realizing some moral 
excellences rather than others and someone being prevented by their circumstances from 
realizing moral excellence tout court. It would also require a discussion of the meta-ethical 
implications of this distinction. For a recent discussion of the significance of this topic in the 
context of catastrophic historical events, see Freyenhagen 2013. 
vi	 Among obvious examples of issues falling under this heading can be counted class 
relations; gender politics; inter-racial relations; post-colonial ‘privilege’ and the management 
of ‘diversity’. (See Section 3.b. below.)  
vii In his (1995), Williams moderates his discussion in Williams (1981), when he writes: 
‘morality does try to resist luck… but not every ethical outlook is equally devoted to doing 
so. I entirely agree that an Aristotelian emphasis in ethics, for instance, need not run into the 
same difficulties’ (Williams 1995, p. 241). Explicating Williams’s distinction between 
Aristotelian ‘ethics’ and what he calls ‘the morality system’ would take the discussion too far 
afield here. The omission to consider this (or some analogous) distinction arguably subtracts 
from the otherwise compelling approach to this issue in Urban Walker 1991. On the 
relationship between luck on the one hand, and different dimensions of moral assessment on 
the other (e.g. deontic versus teleological), see e.g. Andre 1983; Smith 1983; Adams 1985; 
Nussbaum 1986; Rosebury 1995; Margalit 2002; Scanlon 2008; Fricker 2016. 
viii	To this extent, the discussion in this paper does partial justice to the claim in Nagel (1979) 
that we are dealing with a ‘paradox’. There is another respect in which the discussion in this 
paper does not do justice to Nagel’s claim; namely that it puts pressure on the idea that the 
apparent ‘paradox’ in question is a real one. (See e.g. the section on ‘redemption’ cases 
below, which bears directly on some of the cases discussed in Nagel’s seminal paper.) On 
one possible reading, the sense of paradox elicited by Nagel’s discussion is the result of a 
temptation to draw an exhaustive distinction between an agent’s subjective point of view and 
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some entirely de-personalized point of view from which the agent is conceived of as no more 
than an arbitrary unit in an impersonal chain of events. Getting to the bottom of this issue 
would require much more discussion than I can give it here. For further discussion, see e.g. 
Nagel 1986. 
ix It may also be a reason why some Christian philosophers, such as Kant, have been so 
suspicious of moral luck. Imagine the difference between A and B being admitted to Heaven 
or not being decided on this contingent and fortuitous basis. (See Kant 1785/1981.) For a 
different view of Kant on (resultant) moral luck, see Hartman 2019b. 
x C.f. Hannah Arendt, who writes: ‘No matter through what accidents of exterior or interior 
circumstances you were pushed onto the road of becoming a criminal, there is an abyss 
between the actuality of what you did and the potentiality of what others might have done.’ 
(Arendt 1963, p. 278; quoted in Young 2011, p. 77.) To Arendt’s ‘others’, one might add: 
‘you yourself’.  
xi Once more, it may also be a reason why some Christian philosophers, such as Kant, have 
been so suspicious of moral luck. Imagine the difference between C and D being condemned 
to Hell or not being decided on this contingent and fortuitous basis. (See Kant 1785/1981.) 
Once more, see Hartman 2019b for a different view of Kant on (resultant) luck. 
xii Analogous cases where practical assessment is sensitive to actual performance include the 
frustration of the perfectly trained but non-employed rescue-team; the unused substitute of a 
champion-winning sporting side; or the well-positioned player who never receives the pass to 
score the winning goal. Pursuing these analogies further would take the discussion too far 
afield. 
xiii The argument in the preceding paragraphs is consistent with the independently plausible 
claim that we should be reluctant to attribute a disposition to someone if that disposition (or 
some developmental predecessor of that disposition) is never actually manifested at all (e.g. 
on a minimal, but non-trivial, number of occasions). I shall take this qualification as read in 
what follows. 
xiv	The ‘flipside’ of the phenomenon considered in the main text would be cases where an 
agent is favoured by circumstantial luck in such a way as to render their moral performance 
‘non-redemptively’ admirable in some moral respect. Doing justice to such cases would 
require much more attention than I am able to give it on this occasion. 
xv The case made in this paragraph could be extended to include a range of comparable 
practices of ‘waiting one’s turn’, or the lack thereof, as one makes the journey from one 
cultural context to another. For further discussion of the role of relevant reactive attitudes 
(such as shame and guilt; pride and blame) in the context of the kind of moral appraisals at 
issue here, see e.g. Strawson 1962; Smith 1983; Adams 1985; Scanlon 2008; Fricker 2016. 
xvi Or: too early. For reasons of space, I do not consider such future-directed cases in this 
paper. Nor, therefore, do I consider the additional complexities that future uncertainty and 
other distinguishing features of such cases would introduce.  
xvii	The historical testimonies of people like Citizen I sometimes involve precisely the claim 
that there was nothing special or supererogatory about their own behaviour. (See e.g. some of 
the testimonies in Johnson & Reuband 2005.)	
xviii	This is not to say that there is no reason to appreciate the genuine achievement of J in 
controlling their biases. Indeed, it would be part of any sensible moral education (or 
‘training’) to generate an aspiration to control one’s biases, e.g. by means of suitably 
managed praise and encouragement and the like.	
xix There is a potential analogy between the kind of moral luck at issue here and the issue of 
‘artistic’ luck exemplified in controversies about the value of creativity and originality in the 
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arts. To pursue this analogy here would take the discussion too far afield. For a discussion 
relevant to the artistic case, see e.g. Davies 2004. 
xx There is an extreme view, associated with Theodor Adorno, according to which if the 
behaviour displayed by some human beings towards others crosses a limit of moral extremity, 
the result is that all forms of (positive) moral assessment are subsequently rendered 
inappropriate (see e.g. Freyenhagen 2013). This is not the view being considered here. 
xxi	Examples of the kind include objections to be called ‘hen’, ‘love’ or ‘darling’, as well as 
reforms of working patterns that favor one gender over another (e.g. the practice of having 
major decisions made in traditionally ‘male’ environments, such as the pub or over a ‘wet’ 
lunch). At the risk of repeating the obvious, none of these practices need imply either ill will 
or conspiratorial intent on the part of their average participants. 
xxii	There are two principal ways in which such a reconfiguration might go. The first is to 
reject the basis of the moral assessments in question and so deny their legitimacy outright. 
The second is to accept the practical legitimacy of the moral assessments in question but 
explain that legitimacy in terms that do not presuppose the existence of circumstantial moral 
luck ‘strictly speaking’ (e.g. a pragmatic justification on ‘fictionalist’ terms). Although I am 
doubtful about the explanatory prospects of each of these options, I shall not elaborate on my 
reasons for that skepticism here. As noted at the outset, for the purposes of this paper I am 
working on the assumption that the legitimacy of moral assessments involving circumstantial 
moral luck is a topic that is appropriately addressed by taking such assessments at their ‘face 
value’. 
xxiii	To this extent, the cases of circumstantial luck discussed in this paper may also differ from 
standard cases of ‘constitutive’ and ‘causal’ luck discussed in the literature. I do not propose 
to pursue these comparisons further here. 
xxiv It is a potential corollary of the argument in this section that if not all coherent moral 
assessments seem really ‘fair’ to the persons at which they are directed, that is because not all 
moral assessments of persons are exhausted by considerations of individual fairness. In other 
words, there could be more to ‘morality’ than comparatively narrow considerations of 
fairness in this sense. (I say ‘narrow’ considerations of fairness because at a higher level of 
abstraction, all legitimate targets of moral assessments could still in principle be treated ‘the 
same’, and so be thought to be treated ‘fairly’ in some sense. The question at issue is where to 
draw the boundaries of morally probative ‘sameness’.) For extended discussion of the 
‘unfairness’ of morality with specific reference to the issue of moral luck, see Hartman 
(2019a). 
xxv	The latter response is clearly something that could in principle be within their control, at 
least in ‘redemption cases’.	
xxvi One issue arising here is the relationship between moral assessments in general and 
attributions of moral responsibility in particular. For further discussion of the intrinsically 
plausible idea that someone could have a moral duty to take responsibility for something for 
which they are not antecedently morally responsible, see Enoch 2012. See also Dworkin 
1986, p.196ff; and Young 2011 for earlier elaborations of a similar idea in the language of 
obligation. 
xxvii Discussions of moral luck are often formulated in the language of moral responsibility. 
Say that someone, A, is responsible for something, S, in circumstances, C, in virtue of some 
morally relevant feature of those circumstances, fC. Those who deny the existence of moral 
luck hold that the range of fC is restricted by facts about A’s agency broadly understood, in 
particular by which aspects of C are within A’s control. Those who affirm the existence of 
moral luck hold that the range of fC includes, but is not restricted by, aspects of C within A’s 
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control. Thus understood, there is no interesting question whether there is a definable concept 
of moral responsibility that is able to capture the account of circumstantial moral luck in the 
previous sections of this paper. What we have instead is an interesting (and morally 
substantial) question of what the admissible range of fC is.  
xxviii A very different kind of moral risk consists in agents making spurious appeals to moral 
luck precisely in order to evade responsibility for morally problematic aspects of the situation 
over which they actually do exercise (or have exercised) individual control. Accepting the 
coherence of moral assessments involving circumstantial moral luck does not preclude 
alertness to this distinctive source of moral danger. 
xxix Of course, some cases that do involve the morally unacceptable behaviour of others also 
involve previous behaviour on our own part that shows that we really had it coming (e.g. 
when someone walks away from the bill to expose me for having plotted to do the same 
myself). 
xxx For a treatment of moral luck that is in many ways sympathetic to the one developed in the 
main text, see Urban Walker 1991, who writes that ‘the match between choice and action on 
the one hand, and accountability and desert on the other is… mediated by complex social 
understandings which… agents are expected to appreciate and… share’ (Urban Walker 1991, 
p. 22). For a discussion of the contestable relationship between moral responsibility and the 
operative question in any given context of who ‘we’ are (e.g. in the sense of someone with a 
certain biography, or a morally salient ‘social self’), see e.g. Dan-Cohen 1992. 
